Code Section
Tool bar
North Carolina > Elections And Election Laws > Qualifying to Vote (§ § 163-54 through 163-90.3) Article 8. Challenges (§ § 163-84 through 163-90.3)

§ 163-87. Challenges allowed on day of primary or election.

Overview of Statute

Section stipulates the manner and grounds on which the registered voter may challenge.

Statute

On the day of a primary or election, at the time a registered voter offers to vote, any other registered voter of the county may exercise the right of challenge, and when the voter does so may enter the voting enclosure to make the challenge, but the voter shall retire therefrom as soon as the challenge is heard.

On the day of a primary or election, any other registered voter of the county may challenge a person for one or more of the following reasons:

(1) One or more of the reasons listed in G.S. 163-85(c).

(2) That the person has already voted in that primary or election.

(3) If the challenge is made with respect to voting in a partisan primary, that the person is a registered voter of another political party.

(4) Repealed by S.L. 2018-144, § 3.1(c), eff. Dec. 19, 2018.

(5) The registered voter does not present photo identification in accordance with G.S. 163-166.16.

The chief judge, judge, or assistant appointed under G.S. 163-41 or 163-42 may enter challenges under this section against voters in the precinct for which appointed regardless of the place of residence of the chief judge, judge, or assistant.

If a person is challenged under this subsection, and the challenge is sustained under G.S. 163-85(c)(3), the voter may still transfer that voter’s registration under G.S. 163-82.15(e) if eligible under that section, and the registration shall not be cancelled under G.S. 163-90.2(a) if the transfer is made. A person who has transferred that voter’s registration under G.S. 163-82.15(e) may be challenged at the precinct to which the registration is being transferred.

(1967, c. 775, s. 1; 1985, c. 563, ss. 11.4, 14; 1987, c. 408, s. 7; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 762, s. 26; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 734, s. 4; 2006-262, s. 3(a); 2009-541, s. 16.1(b); 2013-381, ss. 2.9, 20.2; 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-144, s. 3.1(c); 2018-146, s. 3.1(a), (b).)

 

Editors’ Notes

Enactment of this section, then § 163-87, as amended by S.L. 2013-381, § 2.9, was enjoined by order dated July 29, 2016 in North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831.F.3d 204, with the provision in effect prior to amendment by S.L. 2013-381, § 2.9, to be in full force. Prior to being rewritten by S.L. 2013-381, the section read:

“On the day of a primary or election, at the time a registered voter offers to vote, any other registered voter of the precinct may exercise the right of challenge, and when he does so may enter the voting enclosure to make the challenge, but he shall retire therefrom as soon as the challenge is heard.>

“On the day of a primary or election, any other registered voter of the precinct may challenge a person for one or more of the following reasons:

“(1) One or more of the reasons listed in G.S. 163-85(c).

“(2) That the person has already voted in that primary or election.

“(3) Repealed by S.L. 2009-541, § 16.1(b), eff. Aug. 28, 2009.

“(4) If the challenge is made with respect to voting in a partisan primary, that the person is a registered voter of another political party.

“The chief judge, judge, or assistant appointed under G.S. 163-41 or 163-42 may enter challenges under this section against voters in the precinct for which appointed regardless of the place of residence of the chief judge, judge, or assistant.

“If a person is challenged under this subsection, and the challenge is sustained under G.S. 163-85(c)(3), the voter may still transfer his registration under G.S. 163-82.15(e) if eligible under that section, and the registration shall not be cancelled under G.S. 163-90.2(a) if the transfer is made. A person who has transferred his registration under G.S. 163-82.15(e) may be challenged at the precinct to which the registration is being transferred.”

Definition [political party]

The term “political party” means any political party organized or operating in this State, whether or not that party is recognized under the provisions of G.S. 163A-950. A special definition of “political party organization” that applies only in Part 2 of this Article is set forth in G.S. 163A-1475. An affiliated party committee is deemed a political party for this Article as set forth in G.S. 163A-1416 and G.S. 163A-1417.

§ 163A-1411 (76). Definitions.

Definition [Voting enclosure]

“Voting enclosure” means the room within the voting place that is used for voting.

§ 163A-1095 (9). Definitions

Definition [State]

“State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

§ 163A-1336 (5). Definitions.

Definition [person]

The term “person” means any business entity, corporation, insurance company, labor union, or professional association.

§ 163A-1411 (72). Definitions.

Definition [election]

The term “election” means any general or special election, a first or second primary, a run-off election, or an election to fill a vacancy. The term “election” shall not include any local or statewide referendum.

§ 163A-1411 (30). Definitions.

Definition [Election]

“Election” means the event in which voters cast votes in ballot items concerning proposals or candidates for office in this State or the United States. The term includes primaries, general elections, referenda, and special elections.

§ 163A-1095 (4). Definition

Cases

North Carolina Cases

Case Name: States’ Rights Democratic Party v. State Bd. of Elections

Citation: 49 S.E.2d 379

Year: 1948

Case PDF: States’ Rights Democratic Party v. North Carolina State Board of Elections

Case Summary: Law governing creation of new political parties is subject to restrictions that such rules must not conflict with any provisions of existing statutory law, even if such restriction is not specifically annexed by statute, as the constitution forbids the legislature to delegate power to make law to any other body. Specifically, the notice of and opportunity to petition for the creation of a new political party are necessary to meet the constitutional requirement of "due process of law." Here the State Board of Elections regulations, which require voters in support of a new political party to file an attachment which disclose the requisite number of signed supporters who have not voted in primary election(s) of any exiting party during the year in which the new political party petition is signed cannot be sustained merely as an administrative effectiveness measure on behalf of the State Board. The State Board of Elections has the authority to determine the registration for creation of a new political party by examination of registration books through the collection of the county boards as a matter of administrative routine before calling on signers to prove signature of the requisite number of qualified voters. However, the Supreme Court cannot determine whether primary election laws impose on qualified voters a moral obligation to such party and to therefore refrain from signing statutory petition for the creation of a its new political party during the year in which such elections are held. Thus, the statute providing for the creation of new political parties confers a legal right on any qualified voted the sight to sign such petition, irrespective of whether he/she has participated in the primary election of such existing political party during the same year in which the petition was signed. [Judicial Action] Where a petition for the creation of a new political party shows to have been signed by at least 10,000 voters and otherwise mets every statutory requirement, the Superior Court shall grant a writ of mandamus ordering the State Board of Elections to cause names of new party's nominees for President and Vice-President on the official ballot in the general election.

Case Name: Lloyd v. Babb

Citation: 251 S.E.2d 843

Year: 1979

Case PDF: LloydvBabb

Case Summary: The classification between potential voters as residents entitled to vote and nonresidents not entitled to vote shall be upheld if such classifications are reasonable and not subject to a compelling state interest. However, state laws which have the effect of denying certain classes the right to vote must be supported of a compelling justification. Moreover, it would not be a denial of equal protection to make certain inquiries of students who sought to register to vote as to their respective residency which were not made of other would-be registrants. Although there is no denial of equal protection under the use of the presumption that a student who leaves his parents’ home to go to college is not domiciled in the place where the college is located for voting purposes. Students seeking registration in the local of which they went to college may be asked specific questions about their financial affairs, such as whether they had an automobile, and where their banking and business connections lay as these would not implicate voting classifications on the basis of wealth or property ownership. It was not an unjustifiable intrusion into the private affairs of students when compelling them to answer certain questions concerning their residency. Furthermore, a student who merely intends to remain at his place of schooling only until graduation is not demonstrative to their domicile for voting purposes; so long as the student intends to make his home in the community where he is physically present and has no intent to return to his former home upon graduation, he may claim the college community as his domicile for voting purposes. Additionally, registrars may use questionnaires to obtain necessary facts to determine whether a student is entitled to vote in a particular locality is permissible. In determining whether such person is a bona fide resident for voting purposes, the State has demonstrative authority and may issue domicile (or "residence") test which exclude only those necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community. However, a voter residing in a town only three months before an election, whose name was registered by one of the candidates, is not a qualified elector. The qualifications of "domicile" for voting purposes are legal capacity, physical presence, the intent to acquire domicile which requires both an intent to abandon one's prior domicile and an intent to remain at the new domicile, and the acquisition of a new domicile which may be shown both by declarations of the registrant and by objective facts which may be obtained via inquiries directed to the registrant by the registrar. If evidence adduced at trial showed members and officials of the county board had failed to require students seeking registration to prove their domicile, a court could enjoin the board from further registering students without doing so.  The courts possesses the power to order count boards to use a specific set of questions in relation to student voter registration as it relates to their domicile. However, judicial purging of voter registrants was not an available remedy in a mandamus proceeding as it would be duplicative of the statutory process for challenging voters (challenging persons were not entitled to a judicial remedy identical to the administrative remedy). But an action of the State Board of Elections in determining voter registration does not arise from a "contested case" and therefore provides no basis for judicial review.

Out-of-State Cases

Federal Cases

Case Name: North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory

Citation: 997 F.Supp.2d 322

Federal Circuit Court: 4th Circuit Court

Year: 2014

Case PDF: NAACPvMcCrory

Case Summary: Various civil rights organizations failed to make clear showing that they were likely to be irreparably harmed by the North Carolina omnibus election reform law provisions calling for increased poll observers, allowing voters to challenge ballots, eliminating discretion to keep polls open, and precluding preliminary injunction to enjoin implementation of these provisions on their equal protection and twenty-sixth amendment challenges. Specifically the voters brought challenge to early registration cutoff under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, as it applies to state election procedures. Under thus judicial precedent, the court held no matter how slight the voters burden may appear, it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests need sufficient weight to justify the limitation. Here the slight burden imposed by the 25-day cut-off is more than justified by the State's important interest in detecting fraud and ensuring that only properly verified voters have their votes counted at the canvass. Therefore, the Plaintiff's concerns regarding election threats to voting rights did not support a conclusion that additional poll observers and additional measures needed to be taken by the State Board of Elections and their motion to preliminarily enjoin SL 2013-381's elimination of SDR on such basis shall be denied. The United States, various African-American individuals, churches, and civil rights organizations failed to meet their burden in showing of discriminatory intent and thus will not succeed on the merits of their claim that North Carolina omnibus election law provision which eliminated out-of-precinct provisional voting violated the Voting Rights Act (VRA) section prohibiting race or color-based qualifications or prerequisites for voting. Nor did individual young voters present sufficient evidence that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm before trial pursuant to their Twenty-Sixth Amendment challenge to North Carolina’s omnibus election provision as any 17-year-old who would be 18 by election day was able to register even under the challenged provision. Further challenges that the provision eliminating the pre-registration program of 16- and 17-year-olds did not discriminate against young voters nor place targeted hardship on grounds that they would have to expend greater resources to vote, thus was not sufficiently particularized to confer standing as any of the state's 6.5 million registered voters would have had standing to such challenge. Accordingly, without evidence of financial harm or a direct legally congnizable injury, the group of young voters failed to allege a sufficient claim under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment challenges. In conclusion, the manner of proceedings in North Carolina's General Assembly leading up to enactment of an omnibus election reform act provision eliminating same-day registration did not raise strong inferences of discriminatory intent required to support these challenges asserted by the United States and various African-American individuals, churches, and civil rights organizations under the Voting Rights Act which prohibits race- or color-based qualifications or prerequisites for voting.

Case Name: League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. North Carolina

Citation: 769 F.3d 224

Federal Circuit Court: 4th Circuit Court

Year: 2014

Case PDF: League of Women Voters of N.C. v. State

Case Summary: District court did not abuse its discretion, in action challenging North Carolina laws permitting the chairs of each county party to designate 10 additional at-large poll observers and permitting any registered voter to challenge the ballot on Election Day. Challengers (United States, individuals, churches, and civil rights organizations) were likely to succeed on merits of their claims that North Carolina's elimination of same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and thus were entitled to preliminary injunction barring its implementation in the upcoming election.

Case Name: North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Cooper

Citation: 430 F.Supp.3d 15

Federal District Court: Middle District of Florida

Year: 2019

Case PDF: 430_F.Supp.3d_15

Case Summary: The Court held that organizations were likely to establish that race was a factor motivating enactment of law; state's argument that it passed law to combat voter fraud and promote public confidence in the electoral system were likely insufficient to demonstrate that law would have been enacted without the motivating factor of racial discrimination; state's argument that legislature was motivated by an interest in fulfilling the mandate of the state constitution to pass a voter identification law was likely insufficient to demonstrate that law would have been enacted without the motivating factor of racial discrimination; state would likely not be able to establish that its interest in withstanding judicial scrutiny demonstrated that law would have been enacted without the motivating factor of racial discrimination; organizations did not demonstrate a likelihood of success under the results standard of § 2 of the VRA sufficient to independently warrant a preliminary injunction; balance of equities favored a preliminary injunction; and public interest favored a preliminary injunction.