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North Carolina > Elections And Election Laws > Qualifying to Vote (§ § 163-54 through 163-90.3) Article 6. Qualifications of Voters (§ § 163-54 through 163-64)

§ 163-55. Qualifications to vote; exclusion from electoral franchise.

Overview of Statute

Section provides for general voter qualifications in addition to enumerated classes restricted from voting

Statute

(a) Residence Period for State Elections.–Every person born in the United States, and every person who has been naturalized, and who shall have resided in the State of North Carolina and in the precinct in which the person offers to vote for 30 days next preceding an election, shall, if otherwise qualified as prescribed in this Chapter, be qualified to vote in the precinct in which the person resides. Removal from one precinct to another in this State shall not operate to deprive any person of the right to vote in the precinct from which the person has removed until 30 days after the person’s removal.

Except as provided in this Chapter, the following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State:

(1) Persons under 18 years of age.

(2) Any person adjudged guilty of a felony against this State or the United States, or adjudged guilty of a felony in another state that also would be a felony if it had been committed in this State, unless that person shall be first restored to the rights of citizenship in the manner prescribed by law.

(b) Precincts.–For purposes of qualification to vote in an election, a person’s residence in a precinct shall be determined in accordance with G.S. 163-57. Qualification to vote in referenda shall be treated the same as qualification for elections to fill offices.

(c) Elections.–For purposes of the 30-day residence requirement to vote in an election in subsection (a) of this section, the term “election” means the day of the primary, second primary, general election, special election, or referendum. (1967, c. 775, s. 1; 1971, c. 1231, s. 1; 1973, c. 793, s. 18; 2005-2, s. 2; 2008-150, s. 5(a); 2009-541, s. 5; 2013-381, s. 49.1; 2017-6, s. 3; S.L. 2018-146, s. 3.1(a), (b).)

 

Editors’ Notes

The enactment of this section, then § 163-55, since recodified as § 163A-841, and re-recodified back to § 163-55, as amended by S.L. 2013-381, § 49.1, was enjoined by order dated July 29, 2016 in North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831.F.3d 204, with the provision in effect prior to amendment by S.L. 2013-381, § 49.1, to be in full force. Prior to being rewritten by S.L. 2013-381, the section read:

“(a) Residence Period for State Elections.–Every person born in the United States, and every person who has been naturalized, and who shall have resided in the State of North Carolina and in the precinct, ward, or other election district in which the person offers to vote for 30 days next preceding an election, shall, if otherwise qualified as prescribed in this Chapter, be qualified to vote in any election held in this State. Removal from one precinct, ward, or other election district to another in this State shall not operate to deprive any person of the right to vote in the precinct, ward, or other election district from which he has removed until 30 days after the person’s removal.

“Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State:

“(1) Persons under 18 years of age.

“(2) Any person adjudged guilty of a felony against this State or the United States, or adjudged guilty of a felony in another state that also would be a felony if it had been committed in this State, unless that person shall be first restored to the rights of citizenship in the manner prescribed by law.>

“(b) Precincts and Election Districts. — For purposes of qualification to vote in an election, a person’s residence in a precinct, ward, or election district shall be determined in accordance with G.S. 163-57. When an election district encompasses more than one precinct, then for purposes of those offices to be elected from that election district a person shall also be deemed to be resident in the election district which includes the precinct in which that person resides. An election district may include a portion of a county, an entire county, a portion of the State, or the entire State. When a precinct has been divided among two or more election districts for purposes of elections to certain offices, then with respect to elections to those offices a person shall be deemed to be resident in only that election district which includes the area of the precinct in which that person resides. Qualification to vote in referenda shall be treated the same as qualification for elections to fill offices.

“(c) Elections.–For purposes of the 30-day residence requirement to vote in an election in subsection (a) of this section, the term “election” means the day of the primary, second primary, general election, special election, or referendum.”

Definition [referendum]

The term “referendum” means any question, issue, or act referred to a vote of the people of the entire State by the General Assembly, a unit of local government, or by the people under any applicable local act and includes constitutional amendments and State bond issues. The term “referendum” includes any type of municipal, county, or special district referendum and any initiative or referendum authorized by a municipal charter or local act. A recall election shall not be considered a referendum within the meaning of this Article.

§ 163A-1411 (82). Definitions.

Definition [Referendum]

“Referendum” means the event in which voters cast votes for or against ballot questions other than the election of candidates to office.

§ 163A-1095 (7). Definitions

Definition [United States]

“United States,” used in the territorial sense, means the several states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

§ 163A-1336 (8). Definitions.

Definition [State]

“State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

§ 163A-1336 (5). Definitions.

Definition [person]

The term “person” means any business entity, corporation, insurance company, labor union, or professional association.

§ 163A-1411 (72). Definitions.

Definition [Office]

(4) Office. – The elected office for which the candidate has filed or petitioned.
(2006-155, s. 1; 2006-259, s. 48(a); 2017-6, s. 3.)

§ 163A-1025 (4). Definitions.

Definition [election]

The term “election” means any general or special election, a first or second primary, a run-off election, or an election to fill a vacancy. The term “election” shall not include any local or statewide referendum.

§ 163A-1411 (30). Definitions.

Definition [Election]

“Election” means the event in which voters cast votes in ballot items concerning proposals or candidates for office in this State or the United States. The term includes primaries, general elections, referenda, and special elections.

§ 163A-1095 (4). Definition

Cases

North Carolina Cases

Case Name: Andrews v. Cody

Citation: 327 F.Supp. 793

Year: 1971

Case PDF: AndrewsvCody

Case Summary: The one-year residency requirement contained in North Carolina Constitution and statute was unconstitutional when applied to the right to vote in local elections.

Case Name: James v. Bartlett

Citation: 359 N.C. 260

Year: 2005

Case PDF: JamesvBartlett

Case Summary: The plain meaning of the statutory section setting forth qualifications to vote stipulated that voters were required to cast ballots on election day in their precincts of residence. Therefore, the Board of Elections improperly counted provisional ballots cast outside voters’ precincts of residence as state law does not permit out-of-precinct provisional ballots to be counted in elections.

Case Name: Lloyd v. Babb

Citation: 251 S.E.2d 843

Year: 1979

Case PDF: LloydvBabb

Case Summary: The classification between potential voters as residents entitled to vote and nonresidents not entitled to vote shall be upheld if such classifications are reasonable and not subject to a compelling state interest. However, state laws which have the effect of denying certain classes the right to vote must be supported of a compelling justification. Moreover, it would not be a denial of equal protection to make certain inquiries of students who sought to register to vote as to their respective residency which were not made of other would-be registrants. Although there is no denial of equal protection under the use of the presumption that a student who leaves his parents’ home to go to college is not domiciled in the place where the college is located for voting purposes. Students seeking registration in the local of which they went to college may be asked specific questions about their financial affairs, such as whether they had an automobile, and where their banking and business connections lay as these would not implicate voting classifications on the basis of wealth or property ownership. It was not an unjustifiable intrusion into the private affairs of students when compelling them to answer certain questions concerning their residency. Furthermore, a student who merely intends to remain at his place of schooling only until graduation is not demonstrative to their domicile for voting purposes; so long as the student intends to make his home in the community where he is physically present and has no intent to return to his former home upon graduation, he may claim the college community as his domicile for voting purposes. Additionally, registrars may use questionnaires to obtain necessary facts to determine whether a student is entitled to vote in a particular locality is permissible. In determining whether such person is a bona fide resident for voting purposes, the State has demonstrative authority and may issue domicile (or "residence") test which exclude only those necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community. However, a voter residing in a town only three months before an election, whose name was registered by one of the candidates, is not a qualified elector. The qualifications of "domicile" for voting purposes are legal capacity, physical presence, the intent to acquire domicile which requires both an intent to abandon one's prior domicile and an intent to remain at the new domicile, and the acquisition of a new domicile which may be shown both by declarations of the registrant and by objective facts which may be obtained via inquiries directed to the registrant by the registrar. If evidence adduced at trial showed members and officials of the county board had failed to require students seeking registration to prove their domicile, a court could enjoin the board from further registering students without doing so.  The courts possesses the power to order count boards to use a specific set of questions in relation to student voter registration as it relates to their domicile. However, judicial purging of voter registrants was not an available remedy in a mandamus proceeding as it would be duplicative of the statutory process for challenging voters (challenging persons were not entitled to a judicial remedy identical to the administrative remedy). But an action of the State Board of Elections in determining voter registration does not arise from a "contested case" and therefore provides no basis for judicial review.

Case Name: People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday

Citation: 73 N.C. 198

Year: 1875

Case URL: https://perma.cc/G5AD-3JV3

Case Summary: The general assembly has no power to change the qualifications of voters in state, county, township, city or town elections, therefore the amendment changing the requisite days of residence is unconstitutional and void. Furthermore the 1875 amendment regulating the election of aldermen is unconstitutional as it violates the fundamental principle of the state constitution, that representation shall be apportioned to the popular vote. Cities and towns, including counties and townships, are within the state and organized for the convenience of local self-government. Therefore, the qualifications of voters are the same as they need be at least 21 years of age, 12 months' residence in the state and 30 days in the city or town.

Case Name: State ex rel. Gower v. Carter

Citation: 143 S.E. 513

Year: 1928

Case PDF: State ex rel. Grower v. Carter

Case Summary: The qualifications for voting in municipal elections are the same as in general elections. Therefore as applied to a vote of a citizen of Syria for the office of mayor is held illegal. Furthermore, school teachers voting for mayor must have established legal residence to be deemed qualified electors. In determining such legal residence for purposes of domicile, intention may be shown by acts, declarations, and other circumstances.

Case Name: State ex rel. Echerd v. Viele

Citation: 164 N.C. 122

Year: 1913

Case PDF: State ex rel. Echerd v. Viele

Case Summary: Municipal election qualifications are the same as those at general elections and hence voters must have paid a poll tax. Moreover, a vote cast in a mayoralty election by a person living outside of the town limits was properly disallowed.

Case Name: People ex rel. Attorney General ex rel. Boyer v. Teague

Citation: 11 S.E. 665

Year: 1890

Case Summary: An elector shall not be permitted to register an any other precinct in the county which he resides until he provides a certificate to the registrar that he has been removed, and his name has been stricken from the registration books. Although, a change in a persons true residence is a question for the jury where a voter has routinely departed his home in another county but comes to the county in which an election is held for the purpose of working there, claiming the county their new home, but then returning to the other county upon conclusion of the election season. Where it does not appear from direct testimony for what candidate an unqualified voter voted, the fact may be shown by circumstantial evidence. In voter challenges, record of a persons indictment and conviction of a voter of a crime, previous to an election, is admissible to show that they voted fraudulently. Furthermore, evidence showing that a voter voted against a contestant such as his declarations made at or before the time of voting, are admissible against the defendant. Although, a person handing an elector a ticket for a certain contesting candidate is competent evidence showing for whom such elector voted. Additionally, if a voter received a ticket from a poll table, where only the defendant's tickets were distributed, and then "came down the line within the ropes and voted" is sufficient showing he voted for the defendant. Ultimately, it is for the trial judge to say whether the evidence tending to show the illegality of a particular vote is sufficient as a foundation for compelling the voter to tell for whom he voted. However, a challenger in a quo warranto matter to try title to an office, may not demand a order requiring a bill of particulars setting forth the names of the alleged illegal voters.

Case Name: Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections

Citation: 187 S.E.2d 52

Year: 1972

Case PDF: Hall v. Wake

Case Summary: Domicile is a fact which may be proved by direct and circumstantial evidence. There shall be no change of domicile of persons staying at summer or winter resorts, or to acquire an education, or some art/skill in which the animus revertendi accompanies the whole period of absence. When determining student domicile, it is presumed a student who leaves his parents' home to enter college is not domiciled in the college town to which he goes, although such presumption is rebuttable. The term "residence" when used in reference to election law means domicile. To constitute a domicile, there need be residence and intent to make the place of residence a home, in addition to an actual abandonment of the first domicile accompanied by an intention not to return to it and the acquisition of new domicile by actual residence at another place to make the last acquired residence a permanent home. Specifically a student may acquire domicile where his university or college is situated so long as he intends to stay there indefinitely and has no intention of resuming his former home. Nonetheless, a person's testimony regarding such intention is considered competent evidence yet not conclusive of the question as all surrounding circumstances and affirmative conduct must be taken into consideration. Determining domicile depends on no one fact or combination of circumstances but rather upon the totality of evidence showing a preponderance in favor of some particular place as domicile.

Out-of-State Cases

Federal Cases

Case Name: North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory

Citation: 997 F.Supp.2d 322

Federal Circuit Court: 4th Circuit Court

Year: 2014

Case PDF: NAACPvMcCrory

Case Summary: Various civil rights organizations failed to make clear showing that they were likely to be irreparably harmed by the North Carolina omnibus election reform law provisions calling for increased poll observers, allowing voters to challenge ballots, eliminating discretion to keep polls open, and precluding preliminary injunction to enjoin implementation of these provisions on their equal protection and twenty-sixth amendment challenges. Specifically the voters brought challenge to early registration cutoff under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, as it applies to state election procedures. Under thus judicial precedent, the court held no matter how slight the voters burden may appear, it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests need sufficient weight to justify the limitation. Here the slight burden imposed by the 25-day cut-off is more than justified by the State's important interest in detecting fraud and ensuring that only properly verified voters have their votes counted at the canvass. Therefore, the Plaintiff's concerns regarding election threats to voting rights did not support a conclusion that additional poll observers and additional measures needed to be taken by the State Board of Elections and their motion to preliminarily enjoin SL 2013-381's elimination of SDR on such basis shall be denied. The United States, various African-American individuals, churches, and civil rights organizations failed to meet their burden in showing of discriminatory intent and thus will not succeed on the merits of their claim that North Carolina omnibus election law provision which eliminated out-of-precinct provisional voting violated the Voting Rights Act (VRA) section prohibiting race or color-based qualifications or prerequisites for voting. Nor did individual young voters present sufficient evidence that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm before trial pursuant to their Twenty-Sixth Amendment challenge to North Carolina’s omnibus election provision as any 17-year-old who would be 18 by election day was able to register even under the challenged provision. Further challenges that the provision eliminating the pre-registration program of 16- and 17-year-olds did not discriminate against young voters nor place targeted hardship on grounds that they would have to expend greater resources to vote, thus was not sufficiently particularized to confer standing as any of the state's 6.5 million registered voters would have had standing to such challenge. Accordingly, without evidence of financial harm or a direct legally congnizable injury, the group of young voters failed to allege a sufficient claim under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment challenges. In conclusion, the manner of proceedings in North Carolina's General Assembly leading up to enactment of an omnibus election reform act provision eliminating same-day registration did not raise strong inferences of discriminatory intent required to support these challenges asserted by the United States and various African-American individuals, churches, and civil rights organizations under the Voting Rights Act which prohibits race- or color-based qualifications or prerequisites for voting.

Case Name: United States v. Parks

Citation: 442 Fed.Appx. 23 (unpublished and not selected for publication)

Federal Circuit Court: 4th Circuit Court

Year: 2011

Case PDF: U.S. v. Parks

Case Summary: Despite certain civil rights having been restored upon the North Carolina defendant's release from prison, his right to own a firearm had not be restored or stipulated and supported under North Carolina's Felony Firearms Act.

Case Name: Fincher v. Scott

Citation: 352 F. Supp. 117

Federal District Court: Middle District of North Carolina

Year: 1972

Case PDF: Fincher v. Scott

Case Summary: The provision of North Carolina's Constitution which restricts released prisoners' right from being restored, including their right to vote, do not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.